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James P. Bagrow
Abstract The most critical time for information to spread is in the aftermath of
a serious emergency, crisis, or disaster. Individuals affected by such situations can
now turn to an array of communication channels, from mobile phone calls and text
messages to social media posts, when alerting social ties. These channels drasti-
cally improve the speed of information in a time-sensitive event, and provide extant
records of human dynamics during and afterward the event. Retrospective analysis
of such anomalous events provides researchers with a class of “found experiments”
that may be used to better understand social spreading. In this chapter, we study
information spreading due to a number of emergency events, including the Boston
Marathon Bombing and a plane crash at a western European airport. We also con-
trast the different information which may be gleaned by social media data compared
with mobile phone data and we estimate the rate of anomalous events in a mobile
phone dataset using a proposed anomaly detection method.
1 Introduction
Social networks are characterized both by their topological properties and by the
dynamics they facilitate. The social spread of information is one of the most im-
portant of these dynamics [27]. Information spreading in the real world has been
well studied. For example, Granovetter studied how individuals use their social ties
to learn about new job opportunities [7]. Modern datasets such as social media and
mobile phones have provided large-scale followups and confirmation to this seminal
work [20].
However, most research on social spreading has been limited to understanding
the ordinary, day-to-day dynamics. Anomalous and extreme situations, such as in-
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2 James P. Bagrow
formation spreading in the wake of an emergency or disaster, has not received as
much attention [1]. Yet with appropriate data these situations provide a context by
which researchers can better understand social networks and spreading phenomena.
When an event occurs, a large amount of activity is generated, and this activity is all
focused on that one event, leading to a strong and cohesive signal. Moreover, latent
portions of the social network are likely to be activated, providing researchers a new
view of the underlying social system, and there is no clearer indicator of the impor-
tance of a social tie than someone in the middle of an emergency or its aftermath
choosing to reach out and communicate with that tie.
In this chapter, we discuss how natural and technological emergency and disaster
events can be used to better understand social systems, human dynamics, and the
spread of information and misinformation. Evidence supports a long-term increase
in the frequency and severity of such events [3, 4], with driving factors including
climate change and population growth. Every effort should be made to prevent hu-
man and technological disasters, but when they inevitably occur it is important to
glean as much useful information from them as possible, not only for scientific un-
derstanding but also to improve our response to future events and save lives.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we describe the history
of the sociology of disasters, and summarize research on using social media and
telecommunications data to better understand information spreading during emer-
gencies and disasters. In Sec 3 we provide a case study of activity on Twitter related
to the Boston Marathon Bombings. In Sec 4 we summarize research on measuring
activities in the wake of emergencies using mobile phone data taken from a country
in Western Europe. In Sec. 5 we introduce an algorithm to detect unusual call activ-
ity in this country-wide mobile phone data, use it to detect 340 anomalies during a
six month period, and define statistics to characterize the properties of these emer-
gencies and how emergency and non-emergency events (such as music festivals)
differ. We conclude with a discussion in Sec. 6.
2 Background
The study of the social response to emergencies, crises, and disasters has a long and
fruitful history within the field of sociology, much of it due to E.L. Quarentelli, Rus-
sell Dynes, and J. Eugene Haas, who founded the Disaster Research Center at Ohio
State University and pioneered the field of disaster sociology [21, 25, 22, 23, 24, 13].
This work, strongly influenced by the aftermath of World War II and the then-current
climate of the Cold War, focused on organized behavior and emergent activity both
during disasters and in their aftermaths [35]. Other pioneering work included case
studies of disasters, such as panics and stampedes at large rock concerts [10]. Emer-
gencies are complicated events, however, and the way individuals react to them is
challenging to study. Indeed, even basic questions, like how much panic occurs or
does not occur among individuals experiencing an emergency, is a contested area of
research [5].
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A primary focus of disaster sociology has been understanding and improving
the organizational aspects of the response to a disaster. Communication problems
between competing and overlapping government agencies have hampered first re-
sponders in many large-scale emergencies, including highly unpredictable situations
like the 9/11 terrorist attacks and more predictable situations such as the landfall of
Hurricane Katrina [15]. Researchers have studied how organizations such as first
responders use communication technology, how their use of that technology has
adapted to changes and modernizations [16], and how and why such organizations
either under-perform or can improve in their ability to efficiently and effectively
respond to emergencies and disasters.
Since the pioneering work on disaster sociology, the rise of mobile phones, smart-
phones, and online social media have reshaped human communications. Individuals
can now remain in constant contact with social ties if they choose, and can quickly
broadcast to a group of online followers almost anywhere. And these broadcasts can
quickly go “viral,” spreading very rapidly online. Social media such as Facebook
and Twitter have played key roles in recent emergency situations [16, 29, 37].
Recent work has studied how Twitter posts spread in the event of emergen-
cies [8, 37]. Twitter is a popular microblogging platform where users can post short
messages called tweets to their online followers, as well as repost or forward other
tweets by “retweeting” them. Some tweets will become heavily retweeted, leading
to cascades. Some tweets are geotagged, containing the geographic coordinates of
the tweet poster when the tweet was made. Twitter posts are public and available
through APIs to researchers, providing a wealth of text and activity data. For ex-
ample, Sakaki et al. studied Twitter activity in the wake of a major earthquake,
showing that tweets can be used to detect an earthquake in real-time [28]. Other
work has studied how information (and misinformation) spreads during and after
events including the Deepwater Horizon oil spill [30], wildfires and floods [36],
Hurricane Sandy [2], the 2010 Haiti Earthquake [18, 19], and the Boston Marathon
Bombing [31, 34]. Twitter is also used by government organizations such as first re-
sponders and by NGOs such as aid providers and relief organizations. Researchers
have studied how these organizations use Twitter to spread information and deal
with rumors and misinformation [32, 33].
Another avenue for data on emergencies and disasters is mobile phone records,
specifically voice calls and text messages1. Unlike social media, these are generally
not intended for broadcasting content to a group of followers, but are instead a
specific, often one-on-one, communication medium. This activity is also not mixed
with news media usage in the way that most journalistic organizations now rely
heavily on social media. This one-on-one nature allows mobile phone data to more
accurately capture individual social behavior and communication intent.
Researchers have studied mobile phone and smartphone activity in the wake of
emergency events [26, 1, 6]. Kapoor, Eagle, and Horvitz used mobile phone records
in Africa to show that phone communications can act as early warning signals for
1 Although smartphone texting apps such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, WeChat, Signal,
SnapChat, Line, Apple Messages, etc. are now blurring the line between mobile phone SMS texts
and online social media.
4 James P. Bagrow
an earthquake, and proposed an algorithm that can accurately pinpoint the epicenter
of the earthquake [12]. Bagrow, Wang, and Baraba´si [1] and Gao et al. [6] used
mobile phone records to study a number of emergency events occurring in a country
in western Europe, including a bombing and a plane crash. These records capture
the temporal and spatial localization of the event from the spike in call volume
immediately following the event, as well as the social propagation of information
(see also Secs. 4 and 5 and Figs. 5–9). While mobile phone data are less readily
available for researchers than public social media activity, we propose that it is an
invaluable source of information parallel to social media.
3 Twitter during and after the Boston Marathon Bombing
As an example demonstrating how emergency events provide a window into hu-
man dynamics, we performed a small case study of Twitter social media activity
following the Boston Marathon Bombing.
3.1 Background
The Boston Marathon Bombing occurred on April 15, 2013 at 14:49 local time. Two
improvised explosive devices exploded in a crowd near the Boston Marathon’s finish
line, killing three and injuring 264 [14]. A manhunt soon unfolded, and on April
18 the FBI released photos of two suspects, Chechen-American brothers Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. That evening the brothers shot and killed a police
officer, kidnapped a man and stole in his car, and had a shootout with police during
which Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed. The next day on April 19, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev
was shot and arrested at 20:42. A police officer wounded in the April 18 shootout
died the following year. Dzhokhar Tsarnaev was convicted of multiple crimes and
sentenced to death in 2015 [17].
There was much related activity on Twitter in the immediate aftermath of the
bombing and throughout the period of heightened uncertainty between the bombing
and the capture of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. In fact, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev himself tweeted
multiple times between April 15 and April 19 [17]. Further, much misinforma-
tion and rumor propagated online, including online groups making false allegations
against a missing college student [34].
3.2 Information and rumors on Twitter
The events and rumors surrounding the Boston Marathon Bombing and how they
unfolded online provide a useful case study for information and rumor spreading.
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Fig. 1 Twitter activity surrounding the Boston Marathon Bombing. Shown are counts of tweets
containing “boston” (case-insensitive) during April, 2013, compared with one year earlier. The
bombing on April 15 is clearly visible, as is the capture of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev on April 19. The
year-over-year regularity of the time series before the bombing is evident in the lower plot, which
shows the same time series but with a tighter range. Year-over-year deviations before the bombing
are primarily due to sporting events.
Here we studied Twitter activity during and after the Boston Marathon Bombing us-
ing data captured from the “Gardenhose” feed, which captures a random 10% of all
public Twitter activities. Figure 1 shows the volume of tweets (and retweets) over
time containing “boston” (case-insensitive). Two strong spikes are present, coincid-
ing with the bombing itself and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s capture. For comparison, we
also determined the number of tweets containing “boston” one year prior, and su-
perimposed the two time series. Before the bombing these time series line up very
well, demonstrating much year-over-year regularity. When the bombing occurs, the
volume of related tweets increases by a factor of approximately 800. The increased
volume persisted for the rest of April. A closeup of the event period itself (Fig. 2)
showed how well events surrounding the bombing are mirrored in the Twitter dis-
cussion.
We next considered all geotagged tweets occurring within 3 km of the Boston
Marathon Bombing blast site (Fig. 3) during the 5-hour period immediately after
the bombing occurred. The authors of these tweets form a population called G0,
those active “tweeters” in the vicinity of the event. We then re-scanned the Garden-
hose feed, capturing all the tweets posted by individuals within G0 and all tweets
which mention individuals within G0. Mentions (or “at-mentions”) are a Twitter-
specific term for posted tweets which contain the usernames of other Twitter users
and are used to focus discussions and alert participants to online conversations; we
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Fig. 2 Closeup on the Boston Marathon Bombing time series shown in Fig. 1. The exogenous
“spiking” pattern of both major events is clear, as are multiple other events occurring in the interim
period between the bombing itself and the capture of the Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
Fig. 3 The blast site (marker)
and selection area (circle)
for the Boston Marathon
Bombing. The circle forming
the event region has radius 3
km. Users who post tweets
from within the event region
during the 5-hour period
following the blast comprise
the G0 population.
Boston Bombing Graphic
Untitled layer
42.349778, -71.078917
KML Circle
Circle 1
used the mentioned usernames which Twitter extracted and provided as part of the
Gardenhose feed. Time series of tweet activity for G0 individuals and mentions of
G0 individuals are showed in Fig. 4.
Both time series show elevated activity levels in the aftermath of the bombing.
In fact, the selection criterion for the G0 population forces the time series to display
a higher activity level, as that time series is now conditioned on the fact that tweets
were posted after the bombing [1]. Beyond this, we make two observations:
1. The spike in mentions of G0 individuals occurs more quickly than the spike in
direct G0 activity. This implies that Twitter is not being used to get information
out of the event area as much as it is being used in parallel with other media such
as news reports. Perhaps these tweets are people trying to reach social ties within
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Fig. 4 Volume of tweets posted by members of the Boston Marathon Bombing G0 population
(Fig. 3) and tweets at-mentioning members of the G0 population. The second spike beginning at
approximately 17:30 is primarily due to a highly retweeted tweet reported by a member of the G0
population about a possible suspect in custody. This event was later determined to be unrelated to
the attacks.
the event region, although the nature of public Twitter activity makes it more
likely that these are news reports and other media and government organizations.
2. A very strong second spike in mentions is apparent several hours after the bomb-
ing. Inspecting tweets posted at this time showed that this is due to one highly
viral (heavily “retweeted”) tweet reporting the arrest of an individual as wit-
nessed by a member of G0. This second spike also peaked at a higher volume
than the original spike, although it died out more quickly. This implies that the
Twitter audience was primed to forward information during the immediate after-
math of the bombing, and the virality of any related content was much stronger.
An emergency event primes the audience of social media for rumoring and other
information propagation.
Taken together, the tragic Boston Marathon Bombing provides an exemplar case
study for analyzing the interplay between human dynamics, information and misin-
formation spread, and communication media and social media.
4 Mobile phone activity during emergencies
Mobile phone datasets complement social media data for studying emergencies and
disasters in many ways. Mobile phones are generally more established in various
regions of the world, having a longer history of use and higher levels of adoption,
and providing years worth of extra historical records and large population samples.
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Fig. 5 Temporal and spatial response during emergencies, as measured from the mobile phone
records of a large service provider in a western European country. (A) The time dependence of call
volumeV (t) (voice and text) after four emergencies and two non-emergencies. We plot the relative
change in call volume ∆V/〈Vnormal〉, where ∆V =Vevent−〈Vnormal〉,Vevent is the call volume on the
day of the event and 〈Vnormal〉 is the average call volume during the same period of the week. (B)
The total change in call volume between two, two-hour periods before and after a plane crash, as a
function of distance r from the epicenter of the crash. Following the event, we see an approximately
exponential decay ∆V ∼ exp(−r/rc) characterized by decay rate rc. (Figure adapted from Bagrow
et al. [1].)
Mobile phone activity, especially voice calling, also lacks the broadcast nature of
social media, acting instead as a direct communication channel. This direct commu-
nication means phone activity captures something very different than social media
activity.
In an earlier work, we studied activity levels in the wake of multiple emergency
events using mobile phone records from a phone provider in a western European
country [1, 6]. These events included a bombing, a plane crash, and more. We found
that the rapid spike in calls immediately following the emergency (Fig. 5A) was
spatially localized (Fig. 5B), but rapidly propagated socially for the most serious
events (Figs. 6, 7, and 8). This social propagation was measured from the time series
of call activity for different populations of mobile phone users: G0, the eyewitness
group, calling from the direct vicinity of the event; G1, those individuals who receive
calls from members of the G0 group during the time period of the event; G2, etc. As
i increases, the group Gi becomes more social distant from the event itself.
The bombing in western Europe provides the most clear evidence for social infor-
mation spreading based on the time series of call activity (Fig. 8A). Here we denote
on the figure the times of the peaks of call volume for each group Gi using vertical
bars. A temporal ordering is clearly evident for the bombing with the peak cascad-
ing through the populations over an approximately 20-minute period (denoted by
the horizontal arrow). The plane crash (Fig. 8B) does not show such clear temporal
ordering of the peak. This may be due to the fact that news media were covering
the crash and that social ties, particularly members of G1, were likely to already
be aware that their contacts were traveling that day. This underscores the different
natures of equally unexpected emergency events.
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Fig. 6 Part of the contact network formed between mobile phone users in the wake of the Euro-
pean bombing. Nodes are colored by group, with G0 representing phone users calling from the
event region, G1 the recipients of those calls, etc. As time goes by more users are contacted as
information propagates. Those same users make little contact during a corresponding time period
the week before. These snapshots show the social spreading one can observe from mobile phone
data. (Figure adapted from Bagrow et al. [1].)
This social spread of information outward from the wake of an emergency is in-
tuitive, but we did not observe it in the Twitter data following the Boston Marathon
Bombing. Indeed, in that case, unaffected individuals mentioning affected individu-
als spiked in activity before those who tweeted within the Boston Marathon Bomb-
ing event region (Fig. 4). This underscores the strong influence the communication
channel has: for mobile phones, it is a direct communication channel and that limited
scope requires a G0 individual to carefully choose who to contact, but for Twitter
it is a secondary broadcast meant to update many followers. Those followers are
likely to be less socially close than contacts reached by mobile phone call, and it
is probable (though definitely not certain) that a G0 individual will turn to phone
calls first in the wake of an event, and then only later begin to use social media. And
of course, mobile phones are not confounded by news organizations, government
entities, and journalists the way social media are.
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Fig. 7 Social spread of ac-
tivity following emergencies,
as measured from mobile
phone records. The most
serious events show strong
propagation across the contact
network. (A) Time series of
call volume before and after
the event, for each popula-
tion G0, . . . ,G3. The shaded
regions denote the extra or
anomalous call volume from
that population compared
with their activity the week
prior. (B) The total differ-
ence in call volume compared
to the prior week during
time periods before and af-
ter the event, for each Gi.
The two events and their Gi
populations are those stud-
ied from Bagrow, Wang, and
Baraba´si [1].
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5 Detecting anomalous events
Given that emergencies and disaster events are useful for understanding and observ-
ing how information spreads in context, it is also worth understanding how rare these
events are. To estimate the rate of emergencies and non-emergency events (collec-
tively called anomalies) in modern datasets, as well as provide an example of the
types of analysis now possible, here we introduce and apply an anomaly detection
method to a country-wide mobile phone dataset, and use several basic descriptive
measures on the identified anomalies to characterize their features. Such algorithms
can in principle be used to detect the onset of an emergency event in real-time.
This is a crucial application for first responders. However, here our focus is only
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on discovering anomalous events after they occur, so that they may be retroactively
studied.
5.1 Detecting Anomalies
We implement a basic event detection algorithm and apply it to the six-month time
series’ of call volume taken from the mobile phone call detail records. This algo-
rithm exploits the periodicity and recurrent nature of mobile phone activity pat-
terns and performs well with noisy data. (A more advanced method, the Markov-
modulated Poisson process [9], proved inadequate for this dataset.)
We first pre-processed the data. To help with heterogeneous tower densities, we
began by dividing the country into equally-spaced squares of size 1×1 km (one can
also use 10×10 km grids). All cell towers sharing a grid space were merged so that
the total volumeVx(t) of phone calls at grid space x is the sum of the call volumes of
all towers within x. Grid spaces that do not contain cell towers were neglected. We
now refer to each square grid space as a location. Since our goal is to find events that
can yield good statistics, we ignored locations that are mostly unoccupied by only
considering locations that average at least 1 phone call per minute over the entire
six-month period. These time series are then binned into ten-minute intervals so that
their total length is 6×24×7×W (covering W weeks).
The algorithm uses two calculations to flag runs of suspiciously high call volume
for each time series, where a run is a time period denoted by a start time and a stop
time). Runs that overlap in time (or nearly overlap) are merged2. After mergers, a
run must have at least one time bin flagged as suspicious by both calculations and
have a duration of at least 5 time bins to be considered an anomaly.
The two calculations to flag runs of suspiciously high activity use the variance
(Sec. 5.1.1) and the recurrence (Sec. 5.1.2) of the Vx(t).
5.1.1 Variance calculation
Each location’s time seriesVx(t) is copiedW times, with each copy circularly rotated
by one week from the previous copy. Now each 10-minute bin t can be compared
to all the other bins that occur at that same time of the week. Dropping the location
index, let us denote V (t) as the original time series, 〈Vshifted(t)〉 as the average of
element t over the W rotated copies, and σ (Vshifted(t)) as the standard deviation of
the W rotated copies. Now we construct a new vector Z(t),
Z(t) =
V (t)−〈Vshifted(t)〉
σ (Vshifted(t))
. (1)
2 Specifically, two adjacent runs of suspicious time periods are merged if they overlap in time or
they are separated by less than four time bins and at least one of the two runs is longer than four
time bins
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Fig. 9 Recurrence plots of V (t) for τ = 10 minutes. Colored squares indicate the log of the proba-
bility for a randomly chosen point to fall in that bin. The run of points in an otherwise unoccupied
region in the upper-right corner of the right plot indicates a persistent deviation from the expected
recurrence and is flagged as suspicious.
Finally, we flag as suspicious those contiguous times ts ∈ [tstart, tstop] where Z(ts) >
Zthr for all ts. In other words, a suspicious event’s tstart and tstop > tstart are determined
by those times t where Z(t) crosses and remains above Zthr. Events where only a
single time bin was flagged (tstart = tstop) are ignored. For this work we use Zthr = 2.5.
5.1.2 Recurrence calculation
Take the original time series V (t) (suppressing location index) and rotate it by 10τ
minutes (τ elements). One can construct a recurrence or Poincare´ plot by plotting
the original time series V (t) against the rotated series V (t+ τ).
If the time series is periodic, the plot will trace out a circular trajectory (Fig. 9).
Deviations away from the normal pattern will appear as regions of the phase space
with relatively few points. To detect these regions we bin the phase space into
squares of size 20× 20 minutes. The probability for a bin to contain a randomly
chosen point is estimated as the fraction of points that fall within that bin. We flag
points as suspicious if the probability to be in that bin is less than 1/(24×7×W ).
For this work we use two rotations, one being 10 minutes (τ = 1), which primarily
looks for sudden changes in activity, and the other being 1 week (τ = 6× 24× 7),
which focuses on changes from the weekly periodicity. A point in time is suspicious
if it is flagged in either recurrence plot.
5.1.3 Results
We applied the algorithm defined above to six months of mobile phone data records,
and detected a total of 340 call anomalies. This corresponds to an average of 1.8
anomalies per day. Therefore, we conclude that researchers with access to years or
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decades of activity data may have records of hundreds or even thousands of small-,
medium-, and large-scale anomalies to study. While many of the 340 events detected
are not emergencies3, even non-emergency events provide a view into social activ-
ity and information spreading that is not available when one is limited to studying
normal periods of activity.
5.2 Characterizing detected events
After identifying a call anomaly using the above procedure (Fig. 10A), we can char-
acterize its temporal, spatial, and social properties:
Temporal The temporal nature of an event can be captured by how quickly it
peaks. However, the time of the peak itself is often difficult to measure accurately
from a noisy time series and may be influenced by any binning of the time series.
Instead, we measure fmid, the midpoint fraction, defined as the fraction of time it
takes for half of the total anomalous call activity to occur. When there is a sharp
spike in call volume, as shown in the red curve in Fig. 10A, fmid will be low.
Specifically, fmid = (tmid− tstart)/(tstop− tstart), where tmid is defined such that∫ tmid
tstart
(Vevent(t)−〈Vnormal〉(t))dt = 12
∫ tstop
tstart
(V (t)event−〈Vnormal〉(t))dt. (2)
Spatial How much an event’s call anomaly is localized spatially around the
detected epicenter can be captured by its characteristic spatial decay rate rc.
We measure this by integrating the anomalous call activity in concentric rings
of radius r around the event epicenter, and fit an exponential function, i.e.,
∆V (r)∼ exp(−r/rc). The spatial decay rate tells us whether the event is sharply
peaked at a location (small rc) or spreads broadly over space (large rc).
Social The social spread of a call anomaly can be measured by analyzing statistics
of the time series of calls made by populations G0,G1, . . .. These populations
capture those directly affected by the event (G0), those who receive calls from
G0 but are not themselves members of G0 (G1), the recipients of call from G1
members not in G1 or G0 (G2), etc. To capture how quickly the call anomaly
spreads through these populations, we define the social propagation factor as
simply the midpoint fraction of the time series of anomalous call volume for
each population Gi, averaged over Gi.
In Fig. 10B we present re-scaled time series of the call activity during the de-
tected anomalies, compared with activity under non-anomaly circumstances. Most
anomalies are short in duration, lasting under 2 hours, although a few were detected
lasting over 20 hours. Likewise, most anomalies were spatially localized (Fig. 10C).
3 We inspected the anomalies manually and determined the origins of many of the events using
Google News, but cannot share this information as it will reveal the country of origin of the data,
breaking our non-disclosure agreement with the mobile phone provider.
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Fig. 10 Systematic anomaly detection to estimate the rate of anomalies captured by mobile phone
data records. (A) The full country is divided into 1 km × 1 km grids. Assigned to each grid space
is a six-month time series corresponding to activity from mobile phone towers within that space. A
composite detection algorithm, exploiting daily, weekly, and seasonal periodicities in call activity,
is then used to flag anomalous call periods (highlighted). The final result is a corpus of 340 anoma-
lies. The bombing and several known concerts occurred during this six-month period, and were
successfully identified. (B) Time series for some anomalies, scaled so that the total activity during
the anomaly is unity. (inset) The distribution of anomaly durations is approximately exponential,
with an average duration of 273 minutes. (C) The distribution of characteristic spatial distances rc.
The average 〈rc〉 = 2.33 km corresponds well to the events studied by Bagrow et al. [1]. A log-
normal distribution is shown for comparison. (inset) The distribution of anomaly start times, as a
function of time of day and day of week. Fifty one percent of anomalies occur between 6PM and
midnight. (D-E) For each anomaly, we plot: the midpoint fraction fmid, the time it takes for half
the anomalous call activity to occur; rc; and the social propagation factor, measuring how rapidly
the anomaly propagates through the social network. We see that propagation rates are independent
of rc and that the bombing shows faster propagation than the concerts. Interestingly, events that oc-
cur during the day tend to show slower social propagation than events that begin during nighttime
hours.
Most anomalies occurred after 18:00 local time, although most phone activity also
occurred after 18:00 so this observation may be a simple confound. Weekends were
more likely to contain anomalies, with Wednesday being the weekday having the
fewest detected anomalies.
The speed of the event, measured by how quickly the localized call anomaly
peaks, correlates well with the social propagation factor measuring how quickly the
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Fig. 11 Principal component analysis for the anomalies detected in the mobile phone records.
Anomalies were manually inspected and many were found to correspond to known emergency and
non-emergency events. Emergency events showed distinct clustering, particularly in the first two
principal components.
call anomaly peaks within the social populations G0,G1, . . . (Fig. 10D,E). This rela-
tionship is roughly independent of spatial localization as measured by rc (Fig. 10D).
We also observe that social propagation is slower for daytime events (those occur-
ring between 06:00 and 18:00 local time), regardless of fmid itself (Fig. 10D,E). For
an event to occur in the middle of the night and have a strong social propagation
factor is good evidence that it is an emergency or disaster.
5.2.1 Principal Component characterization
Lastly, we performed a principal component analysis (PCA) [11] on the 340 de-
tected events (including events that were found by manual inspection to correspond
to those studied by Bagrow et al. [1]). Nine measurements (or features) were de-
termined for each event: the spatial size of the event rc; the speed at which the
event occurs fmid; the time of day; event duration; total number of calls; affected
population size |G0|; the “social decay rate,” the ratio of the total number of calls
made by population Gi vs. Gi−1 averaged over i; the z-score for the total number
of anomalous calls placed by population Gi, averaged over i; and weighted social
distance ∑i i×Vtotal(Gi)/∑iVtotal(Gi). These measures are intended to capture many
different aspects of the call anomalies, and more can in principle by used, under the
assumption that PCA will “net out” the most relevant linear combinations of these
features. A 340× 9 data matrix is then constructed. The first three principal com-
ponents are shown here (Fig. 11). We found a clustering of known emergencies,
with known non-threatening events appearing mostly as outliers. The clustering of
emergencies is evidence that the measures introduced here can be used to categorize
events without additional information.
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6 Discussion
In this chapter, we discussed how to measure information or activity spreading
through a social system in the wake of an emergency, disaster or other anomalous
event. Such emergency events act as “found experiments,” providing researchers
with new contexts and windows on the underlying social system. We presented a
case study of information spread on Twitter following the Boston Marathon Bomb-
ing, and described measures of social spreading within a western European country
captured from mobile phone records. Mobile phone data are limited in scope—
lacking, for example, contextual details such as the text information available in so-
cial media—and are generally less freely available to researchers. But mobile phone
datasets strongly complement other data such as those taken from Twitter because
phone calls and text messages represent one-on-one, direct communication and are
not confounded by broadcast effects and news media the way Twitter is.
Comparing the spreading dynamics on Twitter surrounding the Boston Marathon
Bombing with the western European Bombing captured from mobile phone records
underscores how different these communication media are, both in who uses these
media and what is expected from these media. Researchers must account for these
differences when studying and comparing across media. Even within a single type of
media there may be great differences: a photo-oriented platform like SnapChat may
present vastly different dynamics than a microblogging platform like Twitter or a
chat platform like WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger. Further, spreading in a single
platform does not take place in isolation: the dynamics of Twitter users following
the Boston Marathon Bombing are strongly influenced by information they (or their
social ties) receive from traditional, broadcast media.
As communication services continue to evolve, and online activity continues to
adapt to new services, researchers will be confronted with both technical challenges
to overcome but also a wealth of new opportunities brought about by new data.
Recent advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence may prove fruitful
here, for example. Deep learning for computer vision may soon allow researchers
to better understand and analyze video feeds and imagery created by eyewitnesses
of emergency events, particularly when those feeds are generated in large volumes,
keeping pace with new smartphone video streaming services such as Facebook Live
and Periscope.
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